19 American Naval Strategy in the Era of the Third World War: An Inquiry into the Structure and Process of General War at Sea, 1945–90

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The end of the Cold War marked the end of an era in twentieth-century naval history. Although competition between the navies of the United States and the Soviet Union never resulted in open conflict, the prospect of confrontation fuelled the development of plans and programmes on both sides for more than four decades. The global war which was feared and anticipated was the subject of endless study and analysis. How might it begin? How would it be fought? Which side was in the stronger position? What strategic and technical innovations might shift the military balance? The plans, strategies, and weapons ultimately went untested, but the story of their creation constitutes an important chapter in twentieth-century naval history.

This essay surveys the development of American naval strategy during the era of planning for the Third World War, identifying factors which must be taken into account, and laying out its general stages of development. It proposes a framework for analysis which consists of five contentions about the nature of the Soviet–American naval arms competition and the strategies developed by the United States and the United States Navy during the Cold War.[1]

The first contention is that the concept of the Third World War, as it changed and evolved over five decades, provides a useful, unifying analytical tool for assessing Cold War military and naval history. There is a widespread popular belief that any global war during the Cold War would

have inevitably escalated to a nuclear Armageddon. The reality is far more complex. Nuclear weapons may have revolutionised warfare, but the nature of global war at any given time in the period 1945–90 would have depended on a great many factors, some easily identified, and some extremely difficult to assess. As a result of generational change, both political and technological, and the changing geopolitical context, strategic planning passed through four distinct periods between 1945 and 1990, each characterised by different perceptions and plans for the Third World War. Both the Soviet Union and the United States experienced this progression, within roughly the same time-frames, although not along strictly parallel lines.

The four periods of Third World War planning can be described as follows. The first was an era envisioning a third world war as a protracted, multi-phase conflict, where use of nuclear weapons would be increasingly important but not clearly decisive in determining the ultimate outcome. This period lasted from the late 1940s through the early 1950s. It was followed by the thermonuclear and ballistic-missile revolutions of the mid-1950s, which ushered in an era of preparation for all-out nuclear war, identified with the Eisenhower doctrine of 'massive retaliation'. The incoming Kennedy administration in 1961 launched a period of re-evaluation and retrenchment which lasted through the late-1970s. It involved a not always fruitful search for military options, establishing progressive levels of 'flexible' response to Soviet challenges. Finally, the 1980s witnessed a period of American resurgence, during which new approaches were developed based on the concept of attacking Soviet military strategies and operational practices, as perceived and understood by military planners in the West, rather than just Soviet forces.

The first three of these periods proved difficult for the US Navy. During the 1950s and 1960s, Navy uniformed and civilian leaders often found themselves at odds with the strategic concepts or operational and analytical assumptions which underlay US national strategy, and fought an uphill battle for recognition of their minority views. Arguably it was not until the 1980s that Navy strategic concepts achieved some degree of general acceptance in US and NATO defence planning as a cutting-edge component of overall deterrent and war-fighting strategy.

The second contention is that institutions, rather than ideas or individuals, make naval strategy and policy, and that navies in general, and the US Navy in the Cold War in particular, were affected by a wide array of internal and external influences. Elsewhere Jon Sumida and I have argued that historians must set the study of naval history firmly within the context

of machines, men, manufacturing, management, and money. In addition, it is necessary to understand how naval culture and traditions shape strategy-making.

Briefly, their impact might be outlined as follows:

Machines. The US Navy in the postwar era may well have actively promoted and managed a wider array of technology than any other single institution in a comparable period of time in world history. Technological innovation and strategy were intrinsically intertwined throughout all the dimensions of naval planning, programming and operations throughout the period.

Men. US Cold War naval strategy was made by at least four generations of leaders, with views shaped by very different experiences and systems of education and training. Sources of commissioning changed, for example, from exclusively Naval Academy, to substantially Reserve Officers Training Corps and Officers Candidate Schools. Nuclear submariners, highly disciplined technical and operational specialists who had a much narrower base of experience in strategic and politico–military matters than many of their aviator and surface-warfare contemporaries, became increasingly prominent in leadership positions by the 1980s.

Manufacturing. The dramatic decline of the US maritime and shipbuilding industrial base – and its impact on the flexibility of American shipbuilding and conversion, as well as on the increasing cost of warships – was one of the fundamental constraints on US naval strategy in the Cold War era. The dozens of shipyards that existed in 1945 gave way ultimately to only four major building yards by the 1990s. Similar reduction, merger, and consolidation occurred in the aircraft industry. The electronics industry is a new frontier deserving increased attention.

Management. The strategy-making process in the US Navy might be said to involve four levels of discourse: what the admirals said to Congress and the public; what the admirals said to the Office of the Secretary of Defence (OSD) and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); what the admirals said to their action officers; and what the admirals said to each other. It is the historian's job to sort this process out, and place it within the context of an evolving national system of policy and decision making. The postwar period was marked by tremendous managerial change sparked by the 1947 unification of the armed forces and its subsequent amendments to the National Security Act that increasingly bounded naval leaders' strategic and operational freedom of action.

Money. Finance and budgeting is an integral part of strategy making. Particular issues for the Cold War era are the impact of unification and Defense Department reform on programming; competition between the Navy and the other services for funding; and the impact of the national economy, and inflation in particular in the 1970s, on spending and force levels.

The US Navy's unique 'traditions and culture' profoundly influenced its strategic thinking and strategy making. There are four points which must be given due regard. First is the profound importance of *operational experience*. A strong operational orientation during the Second World War and into the 1950s led the US Navy to emphasise deploying its forces at sea, and developing strategies based on current capabilities and actual operational experience.

Second, the US Navy's concepts of leadership and systems for decision-making were grounded in the common experience of its leadership experienced in *command at sea* which was central to its systems of training and promotion. Operations at sea required pragmatism, flexibility, individual initiative, and individual responsibility. Decision-making was remarkably decentralised, with each commander exercising both individual initiative, and total responsibility. Coordination was achieved not by careful pre-planning and the hierarchical delegation of authority, but by cooperation on the basis of common knowledge and experience.

Third, the strategy built on this foundation was deliberately ambiguous, open-ended, and flexible. The Navy had *no written strategic doctrine* equivalent to those that were regularly reassessed and rewritten in the US Army and US Air Force. Such an approach to strategy-making ran strongly counter to the rigid strategic plans being adopted by the American JCS and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in the 1950s.

Finally, it is important to note the influence of this Navy culture on force structure. The US Navy sought to maintain *internally balanced, multi-purpose forces* capable of pursuing a wide variety of objectives. The air, surface, and submarine communities within the Navy increasingly competed with each other for funding and prominence, but without the expectation that any branch of the service was expendable, or that one branch could completely dominate the others.

The third contention of this paper is that between 1948 and 1961, the US Navy developed a mature, broad and flexible strategy for guiding operations in peace and war. It was in many respects a significant departure from what had come before in US naval history. This strategy rested on four main pillars:

The first pillar was a *Peacetime Strategy of Forward Deployment*. Prior to the Second World War, between 1922 and 1941, there had been a single US Fleet based on the continental United States, with only small, generally ill-equipped forces deployed overseas in Europe, Asia, and the

Caribbean. The Fleet came together annually for fleet exercises. The postwar US Navy, by contrast, was organised into two geographic fleets and four major striking fleets, two of which were permanently deployed overseas (although the forces rotated at six-month intervals). Carrier task forces, not the traditional battle line, determined much of the task organisation. Forward deployment focused on countering the Soviet submarine threat to allied Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), and on the newly formed land-based Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA). It aimed both at deterring the USSR and at expanding US influence overseas with allies and neutral states. Missions for the forward deployed fleets shifted in emphasis in line with changing national policy. During the 1950s they served as nuclear alert forces as well as first response forces in local crises.

The second pillar was a *Wartime Strategy of Forward Defence*. Built on the nuclear and conventional capabilities of the forward-deployed strike fleets, this strategy provided for power projection into Europe and Asia at the outset of a global conflict, and envisioned the forward deployment of additional naval forces around the periphery of the USSR as the conflict developed. Plans were made for attacks on 'targets of naval interest', including naval bases, port facilities, naval airfields and associated industries, in order to destroy, if possible, Soviet submarine and naval air forces before they could threaten the SLOCs. The strategy also provided for defensive and offensive anti-submarine barriers in the north Atlantic and Norwegian Sea, along with hunter-killer groups and convoy escorts to defend the SLOCs. Although some early advocates of naval air power envisioned a leading role for the Navy in the strategic nuclear offensive, most naval leaders rejected that option, preferring to concentrate on maritime objectives and the supplementary use of naval air power in support of ground forces.

The third pillar of US postwar naval strategy was an 'Alternative Nuclear Strategy' which came into focus in the mid- to late-1950s. As noted above, during the first decade of the Cold War, the United States increasingly emphasised the full-scale nuclear air offensive as its primary attack option in a general war. The Navy's alternative strategy, as enunciated by Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, in 1956, grew out of Burke's commitment to reducing reliance on strategic nuclear warfare and its vulnerable land-based delivery forces. In pursuit of this objective he promoted rapid development of submarine-based ballistic-missile technology. Best described by the terms 'Finite Deterrence, Controlled Retaliation, Secure Basing', the alternative nuclear strategy envisioned a force of forty-five nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) that would target a finite, rather than constantly expanding, number of Soviet military and civilian targets. It would provide for controlled, incremental attacks on those targets in the event of war, so as to exercise coercive leverage against the Soviet leadership while reducing potential casualties. Sea-basing made such withholding feasible: Polaris submarines at sea were not readily targetable by the Soviets when submerged, and thus avoided the 'use it or lose it' dynamic of land-based forces on airfields, 'soft' missile bases and even hardened missile silos. Burke argued that as the nation moved into the missile age in the 1960s, such a strategy and its attendant weapons systems should replace the nation's reliance on SAC as its first line of nuclear defence.

The fourth pillar of postwar Navy strategy was the emphasis placed on preparations for *Limited War*. Doubts about orienting national strategy primarily toward general war had been voiced in the Navy in the 1940s, and these were consolidated by the experience of the Korean War. In 1954–55, the Navy's first full postwar long-range shipbuilding plan postulated that limited rather than general war would be the nation's and the Navy's primary national security challenge in the future, a posture which was reaffirmed in 1957–58 and after. While limited war planning initially focused primarily on Asia (Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam) and the Middle East, Nikita Khrushchev's threat of a confrontation over Berlin in 1958–59 sparked the development of US and NATO Maritime Contingency (MARCON) planning for potential crises in Europe. After the Castro takeover of Cuba in 1959, and the failure of the Central Intelligence Agency's Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, plans were also drawn up for blockading, striking, or invading Cuba as well.

The fourth contention of this paper is that the larger context of national politics, defence policy, foreign affairs, and economics and finance within which the Navy functioned, effectively prevented full implementation of its four-pillared strategy during the two decades from the early 1960s to the late 1970s.

During the Eisenhower years, the Navy had worked at cross purposes with a national policy dominated by a strategic nuclear fixation which undermined mobilisation, naval industrial infrastructure, and the maintenance of any capability to fight a protracted conventional war. Adoption in 1960 of the first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for general nuclear war, which called for a single, massive coordinated strike against all targets, involved an explicit rejection of the Navy's strategy of finite deterrence/controlled retaliation.

The incoming Kennedy administration shared many of the Navy's reservations about massive retaliation, but failed to understand or pursue the alternative strategy the Navy had developed. The problem was

Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, which relied heavily on quantitative and systems analysis, tools generally unsuited to evaluating the flexible, organic Navy approach to planning, or the warfare capabilities inherent in its multi-purpose warships. The failure of McNamara's defence team to build on the Navy's strategic pillars appears to have been an important missed opportunity in American national defence planning.

The Vietnam war brought new problems, including the rapid degrading of the Navy's supply of ships and aircraft as a result of heavy operational demands, and a general decline in military morale and confidence. The inflation and economic weakness of the late-1970s made it impossible for the Navy to rebuild the fleet to anything approaching the 700 to 900 ships it had planned for in the 1960s, or even the 600 it hoped to have by 1980. As a result of the pressures of these two difficult decades, the Navy of the late 1970s was seriously diminished in capabilities, lacking confidence in its own strategies, divided internally, and profoundly concerned that it would be unable to counter the expanding Soviet maritime threat. The spectre of a powerful Soviet Navy leaving home waters, overwhelming US and allied defensive chokepoints and barriers, and proceeding into the open oceans to disrupt the SLOCs grew to near-crisis proportions from the late-1960s through the mid-1970s.

The final contention is that the US Navy's Maritime Strategy, as it evolved in the 1980s, was a culmination and fulfilment of the postwar strategy which for so many years had appeared doomed to irrelevance. It involved a multi-faceted approach to the maritime dimensions of the military and diplomatic problems facing the United States and the NATO alliance, and served as a vehicle for rebuilding morale and consensus within the Navy community. The beating heart of the Maritime Strategy was the exploitation of both existing forces and technological innovation in an operational context, informed by a new understanding of the nature of Soviet naval strategy in war. The main objective of the strategy was to enhance deterrence by attacking the Soviet strategic mindset before war began.

The Maritime Strategy grew out of a variety of dynamics. Among the most important were challenges posed by the international environment of the late-1970s. The continuing strategic arms competition between the US and USSR, and the questions it raised about Soviet intentions, as addressed by the 1976–77 Team A/Team B intelligence analyses, was one spur. So too was the end of detente, signalled by increased Soviet support of insurgent movements in Africa and military client states in the Middle East and south-west Asia, and most significantly the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

Geopolitics also played a role. The People's Republic of China, formerly a favourite target of Navy general and limited war planning, was now a potential ally against the USSR, while Japan's economic miracle made it not just a mutual defence-treaty partner but also a potential 'arsenal of high-tech democracy'. The growing importance of China and Japan led to a reassessment during the Carter administration of the traditional 'swing' strategy, which called for US forces in Asia and the Pacific to swing to Europe in event of a major crisis. Finally, the continuing growth and modernisation of the Soviet Navy, including its greatly strengthened capacity for global operations, created a maritime challenge that was hard for even the most continental-minded defence intellectual to ignore.

The national political climate within the United States also contributed to support for a naval strategic initiative. In particular, the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980 signalled a full-scale political commitment to reversing downward defence-funding trends and an increase in rhetorical challenges to the USSR. Reagan had been elected on a platform that resurrected a national requirement for a 600-ship Navy, and the author of that particular platform plank, John F. Lehman, Jr., was appointed Navy Secretary in 1981. In his first few years in office, Lehman was allowed enormous leeway by Congress and OSD in seeking to recast the Navy and its leadership in the image he thought appropriate to an aggressive American maritime resurgence in a renewed Cold War. Furthermore, in 1982 the Reagan administration issued a National Security Decision Directive that mandated development of the capability for fighting a protracted (time-frame unspecified) conventional war with the USSR and its allies, looking to sequential rather than simultaneous military options to provide leverage. Such a policy, however difficult to implement, reversed the assumption, almost universally accepted from the 1950s on, that a quick, decisive and disastrous nuclear conflict would be the inevitable outcome of global war.

Finally, the Maritime Strategy grew out of the Navy as an institution. Some of the root causes of change were technical and operational while others related to conceptual innovation and strategic process. With respect to technology and operations, three developments stand out. The first was the progress made in the gathering, analysing and disseminating of operational intelligence on the Soviet Navy. In the early 1970s, the Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) was established in a cluster of national and fleet operational intelligence centres. By the 1980s, this system and its associated intelligence sensors provided Navy operational commanders and strategic planners with an unprecedented picture of the capabilities and disposition of current Soviet maritime forces.

The second development involved putting to sea a collection of high-technology sensors, command, control and communications systems, and accurate long-range conventional weapons systems that would enable naval operational commanders to operate forward in a hostile environment more effectively than ever before. The Aegis cruisers, armed with long-range land-attack cruise missiles, surface-to-air defences, anti-ship missiles, and a long-range command, control and warning system, first deployed in the early 1980s, in particular, represented a quantum leap over prior capabilities.

Thirdly, the late-1970s and early-1980s saw a rebirth of tactical planning in the US Navy, built on both the information OSIS provided about the Soviet air, surface and sub-surface threats, and the new technology finally being brought into the fleet. The Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) system, with its associated command and control systems and tactical command procedures and applications, was designed to take carrier battle-groups into enemy waters, and fight and defeat the attacking air, surface, and submarine threats. This forward defence would serve both to defend the SLOCs and position the Navy to provide air support for the land battle in Northern and Central Europe.

Strategic and programme planning initiatives played an important role in furthering the process of strategic innovation in Washington and in fleet headquarters. The 1978 Navy force planning study, SEA PLAN 2000, argued for a 14-carrier, 28-Aegis cruiser, 98-nuclear attack submarine (SSN) 'lower risk' (*vis-a-vis* the Soviet maritime threat) navy, one that required a funding level of sustained four per cent 'real growth.' Based conservatively on available technology, not proposed future developments, it presaged Lehman's subsequent proposal for a 15-carrier, 100-SSN, 600-ship fleet, despite contemporary analyses which showed these to be economically and financially unattainable or at least unsustainable force goals.

Among the important strategic planning initiatives was a series of exercises conducted by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in the late-1970s, codenamed 'Seastrike'. Designed to use carrier battle-forces to draw out and neutralise the Soviet Navy in the event of war, these became the basis for much of Hayward's offensive thinking and planning for naval strategy in a 'come as you are global war' when he served as Chief of Naval Operations in 1978–82.

A final critical factor was an emerging intelligence consensus on the strategic concepts that would most likely govern Soviet initiatives in the event of war. Such analyses were developed, based in part on Soviet military writings and doctrine, beginning in the late-1970s, and resulted in

such initiatives as the so-called 'countervailing strategy' for nuclear war, the US Army's AirLand Battle Doctrine and NATO's strategy of Follow-On-Forces-Attack to counter Soviet deep penetration tactics in Europe. Naval analysts concluded, as presented in the 1982 National Intelligence Estimate, that the Soviet Navy would follow a largely defensive strategy, placing highest priority on defending the Soviet homeland from sea-borne attack out to a range of some 2,000 to 3,000 kilometres, within reach of the US SLOCs to Europe and East Asia. Its SSBN forces would be deployed not into the open oceans, but into heavily defended maritime bastions near Soviet home waters.

Based on this intelligence consensus, the Navy settled on an avowedly offensive strategy toward the USSR, as a key component of the Maritime Strategy. If the USSR was predisposed to use large portions of its naval air and submarine forces to defend the approaches to the motherland, and to shelter its SSBNs in home waters, navy strategists argued, it was clearly in the American interest to reinforce such an inclination. An offensive posture would serve, it was hoped, as an active deterrent to an actual outbreak of hostilities during a crisis, and if hostilities broke out, would help to keep the Soviet Navy on the defensive and in a position of relative vulnerability.

The Maritime Strategy was the first explicit revision of the phasing of US strategy since US joint war plans in the 1950s moved from a multi-phase protracted war to a two-phase nuclear conflict. The strategy's three phases, Transition to War, Seizing the Initiative, and Carrying the Fight to the Enemy were ambiguous by design, but they clearly indicated that the US was once again preparing to defend the seas in a protracted, conventional campaign of forward defence. Moreover, there was more than one campaign. The Maritime Strategy involved multiple theatres of operations, each with its own set of campaign objectives to be run by on-scene commanders in keeping with the service's long-held strategic traditions and operational practice.

After two decades of decline and doubt, the US Navy's strategies developed in the 1950s seemed to be coming into their own. Forward deployment and forward defence were intrinsic aspects of the Maritime Strategy, enhanced by new understanding of Soviet naval strategy, and new technologies and techniques, that enabled ships and submarines to undertake operations much farther forward than had been envisioned in the 1950s. The third pillar of Navy strategic thinking, the alternate nuclear strategy, was not adopted as such, but the nation was moving toward greater reliance on secure sea basing as evidenced in deployment of a second generation of Trident SSBNs beginning in the early 1980s, and decisively

rejecting the 1950s concept, to which the Navy had so strongly objected, that global war would automatically escalate to strategic nuclear conflict. Finally, throughout the 1980s, the US Navy found itself employed in crisis and contingency operations around the globe which did not involve a confrontation with the Soviet Union: off Grenada, Lebanon, and Libya, and in the Persian Gulf. Such operations verified the need for a fleet flexible enough to function effectively not just in global conflict, but in limited war.

What impact did forty-five years of preparing for a Third World War have on the United States Navy? The answer seems to be that the Navy came out stronger for the experience. The many and rapid changes in national and alliance policy and strategy, the intense interservice disagreements over policy guidance, strategic plans, programme/priorities and budget allocations, and the changing internal administrative structures and processes of the Navy itself – particularly those designed to develop and field high technology – were challenges successfully met.

The US Navy of the 1980s proved itself to be an institution of remarkable political proficiency, technical genius and professional flexibility, capable not only of adapting to changes mandated by policy fiat, but also of generating such changes based on its own unique professional mindset. One observer described that peculiar Navy mindset as 'arrogant in victory, surly in defeat, and difficult at all points in between', much to the delight of numerous senior naval officers proud of their independent ways. The upshot of four decades of Navy recalcitrance and cross-grained analysis of national defence policy was a remarkably capable force structure and strategy designed to deal with a wide array of potential threats from the USSR. The remarkable shift within a two-year period from a Cold War strategy for fighting the Third World War on the open ocean to a post-Cold War strategy that emphasised a violent peace and littoral warfare, both exploiting existing capabilities, testifies to the inherent flexibility and adaptability of the Navy's approach to strategy-making.

External criticism of the Navy in recent decades has usually focused on the problem of force composition, particularly the numbers of existing forces, rather than on prospective technological developments. The large aircraft carrier has attracted by far the most criticism. In the 1940s, the Air Force, planning primarily for a nuclear war, argued that most if not all large carriers should be decommissioned, a course of action that would have proved disastrous when the Korean War began. The 1950s and 1960s saw a debate on numbers of active large carriers: the Navy generally arguing for 15 or 16; the other services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense advocating 10 to 12. The 600-ship navy envisioned 15 carriers for the 1980s and beyond. Significantly, this number represented a comfortable force-level for peacetime and crisis operations rather than for a general war with the USSR.

Recently declassified documents indicate that the Navy considered an adequate carrier force-level for a non-nuclear war with the USSR to be 24, indicating that preparation for a conventional Third World War was never seriously considered. The costs would have been prohibitive. In fact, while naval planners generally 'kept their eye on the big red bear', the force-levels they advocated related primarily to forward presence and crisis response missions, based on political realism and immediate operational requirements. The one area where this approach may have proved in error relates to nuclear attack submarine force-levels. By the 1980s, SSNs had become the capital ships of the Third World War, and the 100-SSN force-level established for the 600-ship navy might have proved inadequate against the submarine-dominated Soviet fleet.

In the end, there is another question that must be asked: what impact did the US Navy have on the Soviet Union, both in its plans to fight a Third World War, and in deterring any opportunistic adventures that might have led to such a confrontation? The answer to that question must await the opening of the Soviet naval and general staff archives. It should be pointed out, however, that it was not until the 1980s, with the advent of the Maritime Strategy, that the US Navy was able to fully engage its strategy with that of its greatest adversary. The Maritime Strategy attempted to do more than counter the Soviet Navy by taking into account its geographic position and its estimated technical capabilities. It was clearly aimed at influencing the Soviet naval and military mindset and dealing with a perceived defensive strategy designed to protect the Soviet homeland and the strategic submarine force deployed in defensive 'bastions'. The attempt to engage Soviet naval strategy as well as capabilities represents the high point in the development of post-Second World War American naval strategy and provides important lessons as to how concepts for the use of naval power may mature over time.

Postscript

Arleigh Burke to Robert Dennison, 6 August 1952: The Navy is very much in the same position with regard to public relations as a virtuous woman. Virtue seldom is spectacular and less often causes long editorials. Naval philosophy and maritime strategy are not spectacular. They offer no panaceas. Their success depends upon long, dull hours of hard work in which no one action is clearly decisive by itself. Its final success depends upon a series of small successes.

NOTES

1. This essay is built on four of the author's recently completed essays: 'Process: The Reality of Formulating Modern Naval Strategy' in James Goldrick & John B. Hattendorf, eds, *Mahan is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond* (Newport, R.I., 1993); 'Nuclear War Planning' in Michael Howard, George Andreopoulos & Mark Russell Shulman, eds, *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven, Ct., 1994); 'The History of World War Three, 1945–1990: A Conceptual Framework' in Robert David Johnson, ed., *On Cultural Ground: Essays in International History in Honor of Akira Iriye* (Chicago, Ill., 1994); and 'Machines, Men, Manufacturing, Management and Money: The Study of Navies as Complex Organizations and the Transformation of Twentieth Century Naval History' co-authored with Jon Tetsuro Sumida to be published in John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Doing Naval History: Essays Towards Improvement* (Newport, RI., forthcoming).

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