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Great Decisions, the Foreign Policy Association, and the Triumph of Elitism in the U.S. Foreign Policy Community

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ABSTRACT

Who decides the national interest in a mass democracy? This article combines international, political, and intellectual history to demonstrate that a significant theoretical and practical debate about the relative power of experts and publics continued within the U.S. foreign policy community well into the Cold War. Arguing that 'public opinion' and related concepts should be treated as constructions rather than innate realities, it uses the history of the Foreign Policy Association to show how the rise of a radical 'elitist theory of democracy' among political scientists was contested by those in the foreign policy community who believed that broad participation in the making of U.S. foreign policy was both possible and desirable. Great Decisions, an expansive, enduring program that began in Portland, Oregon, in 1955, was the Association's attempt to prove elitist theory wrong, but its attempt to contest the new political science at scale faltered precisely because it conceived of participation in ways that tended to appeal to white, educated, usually wealthy citizens. With the failure of Great Decisions, the foreign policy community gave up on participation, the assumption becoming widespread that foreign policy was, and could only be, the domain of experts and elites.

KEYWORDS

U.S. foreign relations; Foreign Policy Association; Ford Foundation; public opinion; democracy; political science

David Brinkley looked into the camera. It had taken just fifteen years, the newscaster said on the evening of 20 May 1963, for Americans to go through 'a deep, basic, and profound change of attitudes to the rest of the world'. This was 'remarkable'. After all, if events like those taking place in Vietnam had happened even within living memory, 'most Americans would, a, not have known where it was, b, cared, or, c, had the faintest thought it was up to us to do anything about it.' But today, the presenter said, 'we are concerned with what happens everywhere, and not only willing, but anxious, to do something.'

Like most reporting on foreign policy issues in the Cold War, this broadcast of *David Brinkley's Journal*, a primetime NBC show, was part fact, part projection. 'Not every RFD box-holder is waiting impatiently for the paper to come so he can read Walter Lippmann', Brinkley conceded, referring to the Postal Service's Rural Free Delivery service. Even so, he said with a tone of satisfied surprise, 'across the country there are groups of people who meet regularly in living rooms, union halls, school buildings, and even in laundromats while the clothes are drying, for organized discussions of American foreign policy.'

Take Klamath Falls, Oregon, population 17,000. Among them was Ben Kerns, a veteran who had worked with refugees for the United Nations in Germany and majored in international

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relations at Georgetown. Kerns ran a farm store in this agricultural town, but his passion was civic life. Heavily involved in community theater, he read out the classified ads over a radio antenna he installed in his attic, and formed a chapter of the Great Books club. NBC caught him leading a conversation on U.S. interests in Vietnam.[1]

'Why', Kerns asked, was secretary of state Dean Rusk 'making statements about these countries halfway around the world?'

The county librarian was there, the local doctor too, the junior-high math teacher and the elementary-school janitor.

'I think that if we pull out or are pushed out', one participant said, 'our prestige as a world leader will suffer immensely.'

'We're in so deeply now', another replied, 'and our prestige is so involved, that I'm afraid we're going to have to stay there.'

'I don't think that we've been allowed to have the information that we need to make decisions ourselves', still another complained. 'We were kept in the dark all the time, and then these things are popped open to us, all of a sudden.'

'I just wonder if our policy in the whole Southeastern Asia has been right', the second speaker wondered. 'It seems to me something has been dreadfully wrong, that we didn't need to be in the mess we are in.'

'If you were Dean Rusk, you'd have to make a decision now', responded a fourth.

'Thank God I'm not', she laughed.

Brinkley told his viewers that they were watching a home discussion group, one of 15,000 or so across the country, with a membership of about 300,000 people. Groups like Kerns' met once a week for eight weeks. They had read a fact sheet before meeting up, or watched a television panel show. That they talked at all, Brinkley said, showed that people 'are better informed and willing to support more advanced policies than the State Department and the government generally think they are'.[2]

That, indeed, had been the Foreign Policy Association's intention in creating Great Decisions, the most ambitious, popular, and enduring program ever launched by the foreign policy community to direct discussion of world affairs among Americans. At its peak, after its launch in 1955, Great Decisions coordinated television, radio, and newspaper coverage, collaborative voluntary association work, and specially-designed educational materials to try to create an interested, informed, active public for U.S. foreign policy. It hoped to show not just that large numbers of people could be convinced to 'use their spare time to learn about and argue about the great issues of foreign policy', as Brinkley put it, but that a specific kind of person could be convinced to do so, one other than the wealthy, highly-educated Americans who social scientists believed tended to engage with foreign policy, at they saw it. It could not. Although Great Decisions reached tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of adults per year, it seemed to prove that there could only be a pessimistic, limited answer to a question that had remained open for decades, one basic to U.S. power and to international relations at its broadest: how democratic could the foreign policy of the democratic superpower be?

If Great Decisions failed, why does it deserve study? For three reasons. First, Great Decisions shows us just how unanswered the question of democracy and diplomacy remained even at the height of the Cold War, even within the foreign policy community. Historians have argued that the foreign policy community resolved the dilemmas posed by the rise of the United States and the fights against fascism and communism by elevating expertise over participation, adopting a radical, elitist theory of democracy that saw most citizens as incorrigibly apathetic, and restricting real policymaking power to those within the national security state, foundations, think tanks, and universities, even if public opinion often set the boundaries for their decisions.[3] That outcome should not be seen as inevitable, nor as theoretical alone. Elitist theory might have dominated intellectual thinking, winning notoriety through the works of Walter Lippmann, George F. Kennan, and academics and justifying the creation of institutions such as the RAND Corporation,

but many Americans interested in the problem in a practical or political sense saw such ideas as dangerously undemocratic. They believed that U.S. power required the creation of a broad, informed, active public that would subject foreign policy to democratic consent; many tried to create it.[4]

Great Decisions was their counterattack against elitist theory, one that built on a long tradition of efforts to create a participatory democracy for foreign policy, albeit a participatory democracy limited by class and race. That the Association was able to mount Great Decisions with help of thousands of activists, hundreds of voluntary associations, and dozens of media organizations nationwide shows the persistence of Deweyan ideals of democracy in what intellectual historians have seen as a Lippmannite age.[5] These activists conceived of Great Decisions as an explicit rebuke to Lippmann, an attempt to demonstrate 'the workability of the democratic process in the world affairs field'.[6] The ironic result, however, was to prove that process unworkable. If public participation in foreign policy seemed unlikely, even unwise to some, the Association added unintentionally to evidence that it was also a practical impossibility, at least on elite models. Telling the story of Great Decisions therefore helps us to explain the gulf between publics and policymakers that became so destructive during the Vietnam War — and that festers still.[7]

Second, by showing how open the question of democracy remained at the highest levels even in the Cold War emergency, Great Decisions shows that the foreign policy community has not always been a homogeneous, insular 'Blob', as the Obama-era official Ben Rhodes has put it.[8] Indeed, the idea of a 'foreign policy elite' or 'establishment' is a relic of Vietnam-era critiques of U.S. foreign policymaking, which is why this article adopts a more neutral term, 'foreign policy community', to describe the people working on foreign policy issues in and around the state.[9] Those terms reflect the failure of programs like Great Decisions to ensure that foreign policy was not the plaything of the few but the possession of the many. But if we take seriously differences of opinion over what the public for U.S. foreign policy ought to be, and decline to see 'education' as a façade for 'manipulation' or a 'pretense' for the reality of elite control, as some historians have, we can see how things might have turned out differently.[10]

Exploring how the foreign policy community approached the public requires studying the institution that tried to solve that problem. Almost no archival research has been done on the Foreign Policy Association, certainly compared to its partner and rival, the Council on Foreign Relations.[11] The all-male, all-elite Council was important, but it was not always as preeminent as historians have made out; the extensive attention it has received from historians replicates the exclusionary vision for U.S. foreign policy that it itself promoted, obscuring alternative pasts that once seemed possible, perhaps likely, even to Council members.[12] Few men within the foreign policy community — and no women — sought such a restrictive model for a democratic foreign policy, regardless of whether the Council published bestselling books or sent out *Foreign Affairs*. Fewer still thought that the foreign policy community should necessarily become an 'elite' or an 'establishment'.

Money talks, here, and it speaks to the importance of the Association. The Rockefeller Foundation granted it about one and a half times more funds than the Council between 1929 and 1941, a period when the Association was the 'more influential group', as Robert Vitalis has written.[13] Rockefeller did not withdraw its funding until 1949.[14] The Ford Foundation likewise sank funds into adult education, giving the Association $6.15 million from 1952 to 1968, compared to the $3.5 million it granted the Council from 1954 to 1974.[15] Only then did Ford end the project to create a broad, informed public that had been central to U.S. philanthropy for half a century. Studying the limits of that project is crucial to understanding why policymakers felt it necessary to turn to the more propagandistic methods that historians have extensively explored.[16]

Third, by drawing attention to the persistence of debates about public opinion, this article suggests one way to solve a contradiction in the historiography. Historians today see the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and the American people through a vast number of lenses.

This has been one cause for the newfound strength of the field, but it has also raised a problem: Americans, as historians now see them, have been 'in the world' in every conceivable way, but Americans, as policymakers always saw them, were very much out of it.[17] We can explore this dilemma by returning to 'public opinion', as well as related concepts like apathy, participation, and democracy. Oddly, at the moment when historians of U.S. foreign relations have put the public at the heart of their field, 'public opinion' itself has gone into hiding, in a way it has not in traditional international history. It is not hard to see why, for the one article on the subject in the three editions of the field-defining *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, from 1991, warned that tracing the 'impact' of 'public opinion' on the 'decision-making process' was 'arduous'. So it is.[18]

This article does not claim to show that public opinion either had or did not have 'impact' on U.S. foreign policy, nor whether Americans were more or less apathetic about world affairs as scholars and policymakers then claimed. Historians, after all, have documented the immense range of ways in which foreign policy, especially the Cold War, has shaped American lives, and *vice versa*.[19] Instead, this article proceeds from the advice of Ernest R. May, who wrote long ago that it might be profitable to abandon the assumption that 'public opinion is an entity which can be described, dissected, and analyzed at all.' Rather, May continued, it should be treated as an 'invention', a 'tradition,' a 'fiction'; studies of it might 'begin not with what is observed but with the observers'.[20] How then did such observers come to think of Americans as incurably apathetic about world affairs? How did postwar experts, unlike their predecessors, come to believe that most people could not be helped to engage meaningfully with foreign policy? If there were decisions to be made, how they did set the parameters for who would decide? Seeing 'public opinion' not as something with a stable definition or an innate reality, but as an elite construction subject to contestation in theory and practice, lets us see how postwar policymakers classified certain facts, views, actions, and even people as relevant. Great Decisions helps explain how that process played out.[21]

Adult education and its challengers

Founded in New York City in the final days of the Great War to support Wilsonian ideals from a progressive standpoint, the Foreign Policy Association drew its theoretical basis from the adult education movement. An afterlife of progressivism, adult education was an ambitious attempt to fashion a new age of mass politics into what the intellectual historian Andrew Jewett has called a 'scientific democracy', inoculating citizens against propaganda, popularizing facts, and placing experts within publics.[22] Flush with Rockefeller cash, the Association did more to disseminate knowledge about world affairs than any other U.S. institution before 1941, with a research staff synthesizing scholarship and news, a pioneering series of radio programs, and a network of branches that made foreign affairs part of high-society life across the Northeast and Midwest. Its reach and influence went far beyond a membership that peaked at 32,000; the *New York Herald Tribune* declared that 'newspapers, the radio and the Foreign Policy Association are responsible for having made Americans "foreign minded".'[23]

One of the Association's early members was John Dewey, who wrote that he knew of 'no organization' that 'combined more effectively than the F.P.A. research work and dissemination of its own studies'.[24] The praise was telling, for the philosopher inspired Association officials as he did most social scientists at the time. Challenged by the totality of war, the burdens of administrative government, and the gullibility of a populace faced with propaganda, interwar Deweyans worked to bring reality closer to democratic theory, conceiving immense education programs that worked their way into unions, voluntary associations, and radio shows.[25] They insisted that people could educate and empower themselves towards truth and peace by participating in discussion of facts. Ben M. Cherrington, who made world affairs education the task of Denver's

Social Science Foundation before leading the State Department's Division of Cultural Relations after 1938, wrote that adult education would disprove the 'cynics' — fascist and elitist — who said that 'democracy is dead, that the involved questions of modern civilization are beyond the competence of the common people.'[26] If democracy was government by discussion, as Deweyans believed, then to improve the quality and quantity of discussion was to improve democracy itself.

Among the crucial features of this imagined democracy would be to solve a problem left over from progressivism and of crucial importance in foreign policy, namely the relationship of experts to publics. Adult educators ameliorated this dilemma by promoting organized discussion, through forums, study groups, and other means. One, Alfred Sheffield, argued that ideal discussions should be led by 'persons with special experience close to the matters in question', but warned that experts needed to encourage 'everyday folk to respect their own experience' and to respect that experience as a contribution to their own knowledge. The experiment, in other words, sought to find ways 'to use "authorities" without succumbing to their prestige'.[27] People should not simply adhere to expert views, wrote one theorist, for if 'the only meanings possible would be those purchasable from experts', then democracy would end. Rooting experts within publics, through discussion, would teach people, but it would also teach experts to work with publics, rather than rule them.[28]

Even so, while interwar adult educators labored to show that citizens could govern public affairs, intellectuals such as Walter Lippmann, Charles Merriam, and Harold Lasswell challenged the practicality of popular governance and the rationality of human nature.[29] Initially a minority view forged in the face of depression and fascism, this theoretical eroding of participation became a majority view among postwar intellectuals, especially as applied to foreign policy. This shift was made easier by seeming proof that the public was not interested in, or capable of, participation of the kind adult educators hoped for. Statistical surveys, which had become an essential national security tool during the war and received federal support after it, provided this evidence with startling clarity.[30] One study of Minnesota in 1948 found that three-quarters of rural people, and half of those living in cities, could not name George Marshall as the secretary of state.[31] Three in four Americans were described as 'politically inactive'.[32] Researchers found that few people had coherent ideas about foreign policy, so much so that most could not 'be classified simply as "isolationists", "interventionists", or the like'.[33] Surveys set high standards for democratic citizenship, ripped opinions out of deliberative context, and let policymakers set the terms for how citizens should see the world, but the conclusion they came to was generally accepted.[34] As the Survey Research Center, a University of Michigan institute close to the State Department, put it in 1949, 'a democratic society implies an informed and active electorate', but 'large numbers of people' had 'little information and few opinions about international events'.[35]

There were two responses to this crisis of democracy, each in dialogue with the other. One developed a theory of democracy that claimed to match society as it was, rather than as it ought to be; in the process, as the intellectual historian Kyong-Min Son has written, theorists working in the shadows of totalitarianism and the atomic bomb replaced '"the people" as the legitimate foundation of popular sovereignty' with '"the masses" as the lethal threat to democracy'.[36] Although Lippmann and Kennan had stronger public profiles, and Hans Morgenthau inveighed against public opinion in political theory, this new approach was best applied to foreign policy in academia by Gabriel Almond.[37] Almond had worked as a morale specialist in the Office of War Information and the Strategic Bombing Survey before joining the Yale Institute of International Studies in 1947, and his theory of public opinion reflected the skills he had learned. *The American People and Foreign Policy*, published in 1950, dismissed Deweyan theory as a 'myth', arguing that most citizens made up a mass whose attitudes lacked 'intellectual structure and factual content', and had such an 'immunity to information on foreign policy problems' that facts had 'no immediate utility or meaning'. Almond therefore argued that policy elites should debate options 'before' — not among — an 'attentive public' defined as the 'college-trained,

upper-income, 'mental-worker' stratum of the population', and should sell policies to the masses only if necessary. Such a theory was based on real fears about the risks of (and to) democracy in the postwar age, but it was fundamentally exclusionary, and it reserved immense power to the state and its propagandists.[38]

Much as historians have concentrated on the rise of theories like this and the impact that they had on the rise of the national security state, there was another, more common response to this postwar crisis of democracy. Almond admitted it by launching an intemperate attack on the 'moralistic' educators who still labored to create a 'democracy of participation and opportunity'.[39] Indeed, it would be a shock if such theories had been uncontroversial; after all, they stripped the magic from what the sociologist C. Wright Mills called the 'fairy tale' of democracy, a story told still by policymakers who lectured Americans, as the former Association member John Foster Dulles did on becoming secretary of state, that 'every one of you has got a part in making a successful foreign policy for the United States'.[40] This was not mere rhetoric. While 'realist' international relations scholars began to define the 'national interest' against public opinion, rather than as emerging from it, more traditional academics such as Dexter Perkins, erstwhile Association branch chairman and president of the American Historical Association, firmly defended the public.[41] Officials detailed how citizens could contribute.[42] Even the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Henry Wriston, lamented that the debate had led many to 'feel that we are a nation, if not of morons, at least with moronic tendencies'. The answer, as it had long been for Wriston and others, was education.[43]

If the Association in some ways therefore benefitted from the theoretical challenge, the new theory still came to set its agenda, in a process mediated by foundations. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace asked Bernard Cohen, Almond's graduate student, to assess the Association's work. Cohen's draft, his doctoral thesis, argued that Deweyans had not only failed to create their desired 'informed and alert citizenry dispatching with acumen the complex problems of foreign policy', but that their 'traditional democratic theory' was wrong.[44] Cohen knew that it was unlikely that educators would dare talk 'in terms that may be construed as 'undemocratic', but he urged that they should in his published report, released in 1953. Cohen insisted that educators could only ever reach 'some of the people, since all the people are not attentive to foreign policy communications', so they should attempt only to expand their socially-elite clientele to citizens already attentive to, and ideally influential in, policy. He argued, moreover, that 'problems facing American policy-makers' should focus their work, allowing policymakers to set the agenda for publics, and abandoning the Deweyan conviction that experts needed education from publics just as much as publics did from experts.[45]

The Cohen report defined the parameters of world affairs education for a decade, forcing it to conform to the standards of a theory growing in intellectual strength. But after a lengthy engagement with this new scholarship, including through a Carnegie Endowment study group that saw State Department officials, adult educators, and academics conclude that 'mass participation on a level of formal discussion seems an impossibly ambitious goal', the Association refused to let Deweyan theory go down easily.[46] Its staff noted the evidence that illustrated popular ignorance, but they disagreed with Almond, Cohen, and others that the Cold War was such a dire emergency that it required abandoning traditional democratic theory. Still, Nason borrowed Almond's typology, twisting it to his own ends. At the top, Nason said in 1953, there was a 15 percent of the population that was attentive and informed, a category that the Association had already 'converted'. At the bottom, there was a 35 percent that was 'politically inert'. But in the middle, there was hope, a 50 percent that was intermittently interested and capable of comment.[47] These people could play their part. 'All we can hope to do', Nason explained in 1955, is to 'trust in the best democratic sense that with a better exposure they will come to the right decision'.[48]

That the Association was able to put this misreading of social science into practice shows how far the foreign policy community remained from a consensus on public opinion. Even the

Ford Foundation remained unsure. On the one hand, Ford had bet on expertise by sponsoring RAND and its imitators while also funding behavioral research overseen by a scholar, Bernard Berelson, whose most famous work argued that apathy was not the danger to democracy that adult educators feared, but its guardian, ensuring that the polity did not devolve into totalitarianism.[49] On the other hand, the Foundation's defining document, the Gaither Report of 1949, had taken the opposite position, imploring its trustees to tackle the 'apathy, misunderstanding, and ignorance concerning political issues' that posed a 'great danger to self-government'.[50] Prodded by State, the Foundation had chosen the Association as its primary weapon in this fight, funding it through its quasi-independent Fund for Adult Education to the tune of $846,500 from 1952 to 1956, hoping to set up hundreds of community World Affairs Councils across the country. Even as that effort faltered, the Association still had the prestige and the cash to make its move.[51]

Great Decisions in Portland

Great Decisions ran for the first time in Portland, Oregon, between 20 February and 17 April 1955.[52] A partnership between the Association and the World Affairs Council of Oregon, it saw eighty to ninety discussion groups meet in private homes and public libraries for three or four hours a week. They concentrated on eight specific problems, before holding a final session on how citizens could influence foreign policy:

1. Does U.S. security, prosperity, and freedom depend on the rest of the world?
2. How shall we deal with the U.S.S.R.?
3. Do we have a 'stake' in Asia?
4. Do we have a 'stake' in Europe?
5. Do we have a 'stake' in colonial Africa?
6. How should we defend ourselves?
7. Do we need friends and allies?
8. Is there an American way in foreign policy?

Each of these questions, intended to be basic enough for the uninitiated, received what marketing experts called a 'coordinated campaign'. KOIN-AM, which reached half a million radios, presented half-hour programs starring local academics after Sunday church. KOIN-TV, as part of its public mandate, supplied films, sets, and airtime for half-hour panel shows on Wednesday nights. KOIN's parent company owned the *Oregonian*, a newspaper with a circulation of nearly 300,000 that gave Great Decisions breathless coverage and lent the Council half its Sunday editorial page. Hoping that this media bombardment would encourage Portlanders to set up discussion groups, the Council also dragooned participants by partnering with voluntary associations from the League of Women Voters to the American Federation of Labor.[53] 'If you have a group of friends you haven't seen in a while', one activist told the *Oregonian*, 'invite them in for an evening of conversation.'[54] An estimated 1,215 people ended up taking part in Portland, with more in groups that sprang up in the region around.

Most of these Great Decisions groups had experienced discussion leaders, not experts with academic or policymaking credentials, but active citizens trained and informed by groups like the League, or helped along in special sessions at Portland State.[55] Each of the participants attended either having taken in a KOIN program or having read fact sheets that gave them the minimum thought necessary for consideration of policies. Sold at an affordable $1.50 for a set of eight, the fact sheets, 22 by 26 inches and folded into eight, were illustrated with maps and cartoons, and doubled as outlines for the evening's discussion. Although the Association was eager to make room for dissenters in the groups, it left little doubt as to the answers it sought. The

fact sheet for the session about the USSR, for instance, wrote that the United States had developed a 'well-advertised increase in military and atomic strength' and 'simply provided day-to-day assistance to Western European countries where economic instability and Communist tactics threatened democratic governments', whereas the Soviets had a strategy of 'constantly shifting attacks on Europe and Asia', backed by a 'huge military machine' that enabled 'subversion, propaganda, trickery, obstruction, sabotage, and plotting through communist cells'. Was it possible to coexist with such a power, the fact sheet asked? 'At what point should we defend against Communist aggression?'[56]

At the core of the fact sheets was an 'opinion ballot', offering policy options to readers and leaving space for their own ideas. The Cold War ballot, for instance, asked whether U.S. policy should be based, among other options, on 'preventive war', 'a stepped-up cold war', or a deal 'for peace now'. (Withdrawal, notably, was not on the table.) Participants were told to mail their ballots to the Council, which would pass them to the State Department, a process that three-quarters of group leaders considered important. Some participants sent cover letters, too. Mrs. Gilbert Reeves of Yelm, Washington, for instance, wrote that the '"FINAL BALLOT" really awakened me!' 'I'm not too well-versed in foreign policy', she explained, but with her 'average housewife's viewpoint' she now knew 'what I'd like to do if I had any influence or power'. Mrs. N. Belles agreed that 'the subject is absolutly facanating altho [*sic*] my knowledge of it has only scratched the surface'.[57]

Letters like these gave the Association's officials hope that they had reached their target, none more so than Roger Mastrude, the primary architect of Great Decisions. Born in 1917 in Walla Walla, Washington, Mastrude had been an Army intelligence officer during World War II, then overseen United Nations refugee camps in the U.S. occupation zone in Germany. After four years at International House in New York, he went west in 1952 to open a San Francisco office for the Association. Covering the Pacific coast and six states inland, Mastrude had seen that educational models that had once prospered in the Northeast and Midwest would have limited success in a mostly rural, widely-spaced region where foreign policy institutions had previously gained little traction. 'We must find our way experimentally', he said in 1953, 'in terms of techniques, organizational framework, and even educational materials.'[58]

The founding of the Fund for Adult Education in 1951 had led to exactly that kind of experimentation. Under C. Scott Fletcher, a former Studebaker automobile executive, the Fund used corporate marketing techniques to try to take small-scale discussion on Deweyan models to the masses, chiefly through its Experimental Discussion Project, which aimed to teach both content, including a world affairs series developed by the Association, and the ideal forms of group reasoning that would create 'mature, wise, and responsible citizens' contributing to a 'free world at peace', as Fletcher put it.[59] More innovative was the Fund's later Test Cities initiative, which sought to make education a part of community life, with some success in San Bernadino, California. Mastrude admired the work there of Eugene Johnson, who demonstrated that discussion groups were more effective if they were made up of chatting friends rather than strangers meeting with an expert, and that such groups could be served by a mass media blanketing a city with facts.[60]

Mastrude therefore had the tools to attack the elitist theory that he deplored. If Almond and others thought foreign affairs too remote for citizens to engage with, promoting discussion among friendship groups would give the citizen 'some good reason for *him* to learn about the subject', Mastrude wrote.[61] If they insisted that it was prohibitively difficult to change minds, he would deploy an element of contemporary communications theory that still believed that small-group, face-to-face discussion actually worked, if it could be made intimate enough.[62] If they argued that the 'average American' felt an 'infinitesimal share of influence over the developments of world politics', he would cite government statements insisting that citizens' opinions counted.[63] If they warned that foreign policy was too complex for most people to deal with, he would, with the help of the staff in New York, reduce it to its 'basic issues', simple enough that

participants would feel that 'the problems are not too "deep" for him to understand', but not so simple that their resolutions were irrelevant to policymakers.[64]

Portland seemed the ideal place to try this out. Great Decisions fit into its traditions of reform, direct democracy, and white middle-class respectability.[65] Portland also had a history of world affairs programming, albeit one weak enough that Great Decisions would seem novel. The Council on Foreign Relations had founded a Committee on Foreign Relations in the city in 1938, and there had been annual institutes dedicated to public discussion of foreign affairs. The World Affairs Council had struggled upon its founding in 1950, but by 1954, it had used Fund seed grants to grow its membership, expand its budget, and exploit its directors' links to the *Oregonian* to earn free airtime on KOIN-AM and KOIN-TV. Mastrude thought the Council had potential, particularly for reaching 'the great "50 percent group"'.[66]

Cohen had revealed that World Affairs Councils reached a small, exclusive audience, but the Oregon Council's leadership wanted more. Its secretary and executive director was Louise Grondahl, a former president of the League of Women Voters of Portland; she wrote in the *Oregonian* that 'never in the history of our country has it been so important for everybody to take an active interest in our foreign policy.'[67] Mastrude found another kindred spirit in Frank Munk, a leading Czechoslovakian internationalist who had fled Prague in 1939 and become the 'special intellectual garlic' of Portland high society.[68] Unburdened by the fear of mass society imported by German émigrés like Morgenthau, Munk saw Great Decisions as a response to Lippmann, whose *Essays in the Public Philosophy* conveniently came out just as Great Decisions began. If Lippmann doubted 'the ability of the common voter to act intelligently', Munk wrote, that did not mean that citizens should 'dispense with much of the democratic process'. What was required was an educational effort to replace an 'ignorant electorate' with the 'small but powerful voice of reason, sanity, and responsible citizenship'. After all, Munk concluded in the *Oregonian*, Secretary Dulles had sent a letter to the Council stating that 'every one of us has a task in making a successful foreign policy for the United States.'[69]

Who, then, did Great Decisions reach? The data was limited, but Munk reported in *Adult Leadership*, a Fund magazine, that while 'the majority of the participants came from the middle-middle and upper-middle classes', the program had pierced 'the "sound barrier" that normally limits education in international affairs to the League of Women Voters type circuit'. Group leaders guessed that two thirds of participants were new to world affairs discussion, and between one third and one half had met in areas where income was lower than the norm. Mastrude's deputy reported that Great Decisions had 'become a topic of social conversation', that 'people who know this community cold say there has never been anything ever in Portland to equal this.'[70] One season of Great Decisions had shown that 'people are educable', Mastrude wrote, citing results indicating a remarkable internationalism among participants.[71]

Convincing adult educators that Great Decisions was a success was one thing; convincing the foreign policy community was another. Although the Association asked State Department officials to ensure that participants received the prompt replies that would cultivate the 'feeling that opinions are wanted in Washington', Mastrude never sealed the deal, admitting that the ballots therefore only had 'symbolic value'.[72] If more help would be needed in future, participants still received word from Dulles, noting his 'conviction that our nation's foreign affairs should be discussed in every American home', and the secretary sent assistant secretary of state George Allen to present Munk and Grondahl with an award in December.[73] President Eisenhower, Adlai Stevenson, and ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge sent telegrams; Wayne Morse, the Oregon senator, praised 'an example of democracy at work'.[74]

Great Decisions really counted, however, with the Ford Foundation, without which the Association could not survive. With its Fund grant expiring, in January 1956 the Association requested $10.75 million over ten years from Ford's International Affairs division. Still a pilot program, Great Decisions itself played a minor role in this request, but the proposal was based on the theory that the 50 percent, the 'crucial group in our democracy', was indeed educable.[75]

Ford's consultants were wary of such a view. Robert Hartley of the Brookings Institution commented that it was not 'realistic to hope to educate everybody about world affairs.[76] Howard Cook, chief of the State Department's Public Services Division and a former World Affairs Council operative in Cleveland and San Francisco, feared that the Association was deceiving itself, trying only 'to enlarge the 15% elite group'.[77] Even so, the trustees endorsed a $1.5 million grant over five years.[78] Having set demographic targets, Great Decisions had to meet them.

Great Decisions nationwide

Great Decisions grew much faster than expected. Participation was hard to measure accurately, because group members did not have to report their activities, their numbers varied from group to group, and they often shared fact sheets rather than buying their own. Still, a year after its debut, Great Decisions took place in 54 communities in seven states, involving about 6,500 adults.[79] In 1959 it reached 509 communities in 43 states, involving 80,000 adults with the cooperation of 120 radio and television stations and 199 newspapers.[80] Association officials hoped that between 250,000 and 300,000 people, many of them high school students, were participating by 1964, but internal estimates found that the program had likely plateaued at 40,000-50,000 adults by 1962.[81]

Great Decisions worked best where foreign policy institutions had not yet become a significant force, cities such as Indianapolis, St. Louis, and Salt Lake City, and in rural areas where activists managed to create a sense of community despite the distances involved. Oregon remained the demonstration project, becoming so successful, with about 600 discussion groups by 1958, that it was taken over by state and federal agencies.[82] Association staffers were proudest of their impact in rural areas, above all in states like Wyoming where dozens of discussion groups formed even without statewide communications, but they got nowhere in the South.[83] Unable to break a reputation for being soft on communism that dated to the second red scare, they had neither a functioning office beneath the Mason-Dixon line, nor strong partners willing to collaborate. Not only was Great Decisions conceived on the racist assumption that black and other minority involvement was implausible, but where it did get going in the South, as in a project in Macon, Georgia, the staff made its peace with segregation, with only two of Macon's 63 groups allowing black participation in 1959.[84]

Still, it was big cities with developed communications infrastructures that offered the best hope, even as the Association's local partners struggled with the flight of their white, college-educated clientele to the suburbs. Citizen educators in a few cities took the chance to broaden their audiences. The World Affairs Council of Boston, which grew out of an Association branch once overseen by Christian A. Herter, Eisenhower's second secretary of state, reached 1,600 adults in 110 discussion groups in 1957; the program became so vibrant by 1960 that Henry Kissinger, the future secretary of state then creating experts at Harvard's Center for International Affairs, was a regular guest on a television show that won a Peabody Award in 1960.[85] The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations dallied with the program, too, helping to create about 300 discussion groups in 1958, before financial difficulties forced it to leave Great Decisions to the *Chicago Daily News*.[86]

But rather than inspiring foreign policy institutions to aim higher, as it had in Oregon, Great Decisions mostly exposed lingering disagreements among activists dedicated to grassroots work. In Baltimore, the women of a United Nations Association chapter took up the program, but their push beyond traditional audiences split opinion among their peers, even though Great Decisions reached only 925 participants there in 1959.[87] 'Some of the old-timers', the Association observed, 'feel that the "common lot" have muddied their hands'.[88] Great Decisions boomed in San Francisco, becoming so popular through promotion in the school system, parent-teacher associations, and the *Chronicle* media empire that, by 1960, people were being turned away from the

forty open, public discussion groups that had been set up across the city.[89] That success came despite the hostility of the World Affairs Council of Northern California, whose director, Calvin Nichols, said that Great Decisions had 'no value whatever', for it was 'unfair to the participants to give the impression that they were getting something significant out of such a brief exposure'.[90]

More foreboding, Great Decisions participants seemed not to be embracing the full vision that Mastrude had conceived. This was most obvious with the ballots, which were intended to 'dramatize' the idea that 'informed opinions do count in the democratic process', and depended on participants both valuing their own opinions and believing that the state valued them, too.[91] Neither was the case. Philip Van Slyck, the Association staffer who handled the process, found that some participants thought the ballots a 'gimmick', while others were 'cynical about the value of communicating opinions to Washington'.[92] By 1962, the Association feared that only a third of participants were filling in the ballots, and they heard from H. Schuyler Foster, the director of the State Department's Public Opinion Studies Staff, that merely a dozen or so communities were reporting results.[93] State's incompetence did not help. Meeting in 1958 with the head of the Public Services Division, Van Slyck told the story of a woman from Medford, Mass., who had written to Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, her congressional representatives, and State. She received replies from all but the latter. By 1963, Foster was confiding that State had 'no plans for acknowledging the receipt of ballots', because it had no staff to process them. 'Some senders-in', he reasonably worried, 'may unhappily conclude that the Department "doesn't give a damn" about what they think.'[94]

If Great Decisions was intended to enliven the relationship between policymakers and the public, then, it revealed only how weak that relationship had become, institutionally as well as theoretically. After the campaign for the United Nations, State had envisioned U.S. power being governed through the 'two-way communication with the American people' that was 'the essence of the democratic process', as undersecretary Dean Acheson said in 1945.[95] Parts of State's Office of Public Affairs initially pursued this Deweyan vision, and the Association was a valued partner.[96] As the Cold War heated up, however, State turned to methods more propagandistic than participatory, relying on a compliant mass media, communications techniques developed during and after the war, and, eventually, the teachings of elitist theory. Republicans meanwhile slashed State's public affairs budget as part of a conservative, McCarthyite attack on the New Deal state, before the Eisenhower administration made further, drastic cuts, in line with the president's view that public opinion could be best approached through marketing, as if foreign policy were a commercial product.[97] Public affairs officials consequently lowered their sights. Upon leaving the State Department in 1955, Cook warned his successor that the government had 'over stressed' the role of voluntary associations and private individuals in formulating foreign policy.[98]

If the Eisenhower administration was reluctant and unable to engage with Great Decisions, the Kennedy administration paid more attention, using the program to try to close what Ambassador Chester Bowles told the president was a 'dangerous' mismatch between the 'harsh, complex realities with which Washington policymakers must grapple and the generally limited understanding of these realities by most Americans.'[99] Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who as president of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1952 to 1961 had ploughed money into expertise, now changed course, promoting Great Decisions with radio messages and reshaping State's public affairs effort on the advice of the Association of which he had once been a member; he, like Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance after him, would join the board in retirement, provide advice on Great Decisions, and even help with the local program in Georgia, where he taught law.[100] Even President Kennedy got involved, despite his reliance on think tankers and academics in policymaking, welcoming Association directors into the Oval Office in 1962 for photos while he browsed a fact sheet.[101]

Even so, the Great Decisions program with which the Kennedy administration engaged was not the one that Mastrude had conceived. Kennedy, who knew of the program from his days in the Senate, might even have noticed the difference. The Portland-style fact sheets had been

snappily-styled single-pagers, filled with cartoons and maps, posing simple questions. The fact sheet the president saw contained dense background on Vietnam stretching to twelve pages of text that recapitulated official understandings of the conflict; it offered nine policies for 'indirect Communist aggression against South Vietnam', from threatening 'massive nuclear attack on Red China' to leaving 'defense of South Vietnam to the South Vietnamese' and twelve to deal with its 'internal problems of economic, social and political development'.[102] This escalation of difficulty and detail reflected a program that was focusing ever more on 'issues of policy on which action could be taken', as a response to the participants, taking part in Great Decisions for the second or third time, who wanted 'more of an intellectual approach'.[103]

Had Mastrude underestimated the public, then? Had the 50 percent proved to be better informed than he had dared hope, more ready to contribute to policymaking? There were ways to measure the influence of Great Decisions that looked to Deweyan criteria, to the impact learning made on individuals and their communities. 'No counting of groups', officials reported from Oregon, 'can set forth the gas station operator who had never before talked about his concerns for the world because he felt it would identify him as queer; the Methodist minister who "rediscovered" his congregation, the woman from the small mountain community who "saw the world whole" for the first time.'[104] But Great Decisions was designed with specific demographics in mind. Eager to show the Ford Foundation that it had worked, the Association commissioned several surveys in 1959. The most thorough was undertaken in Boston, where Alfred Hero, a social psychologist who was secretary of the World Peace Foundation, concluded that the participants were 'among the better-informed, better-read, the more active and highly-motivated two or three percent of the population'. 93 percent of men participating in the Boston area were college-educated, and 46 percent had graduate degrees. Most participants came from households earning far more than the national median income, the majority among the tenth of Americans who belonged to at least four voluntary associations.[105]

Indeed, the median participant in Great Decisions turned out to look much the same as the median participant of most world affairs programs, the same as most participants in other study-discussion programs, like the Great Books clubs: a white, highly-educated, probably-wealthy housewife, already active in civic life.[106] Foreign policy discussion appealed mostly to those with some familiarity with the subject. There was scant evidence of success on Mastrude's terms: just 32 percent of participants nationwide were not regular lecture-goers, 25 percent did not have college credits, and 39 percent earned the median household income or less.[107] Contemporaries estimated that less than 1 percent of Americans had ever read a book on foreign affairs outside school, but 65 percent of participants surveyed in 1960 had read one or more.[108] Surveys taken in Colorado in 1961 and Wisconsin in 1962 confirmed similar findings. In the Rockies, although first-time participants were as likely to have no college education as graduate degrees, repeat participants almost all had degrees, suggesting that the either the subject matter or the program turned more-interested but less-educated citizens away.[109] From Hero, who a year later would write that only an 'atypical' 1 percent of Americans approached the ideal of foreign policy citizenship, came the verdict: Great Decisions reached more of the same people whom educators traditionally reached, proving that it was 'unrealistic' to aim beyond that. The very elitism of those challenging 'elitist theory' proved that theory right.[110]

Mastrude was left dejected, even as Great Decisions remained the Association's major program, albeit recast as the 'theoretically ideal' program to reach the audience he had tried to push beyond.[111] Watching adult educators in turn away from the masses, he warned privately in 1959 that to 'deny the capacity of the people to think and choose well for their society' was to 'assume that democracy is a preposterous sham', to warn that 'unless we can educate the public to reasonable understanding of the great international issues, we are left with no rational grounds for continuing to believe democracy to be viable.'[112] But Mastrude could not find the room, institutionally or theoretically: he turned to projects for corporate executives, and

eventually abandoned adult education altogether, developing programs for schools. Near bankruptcy, the Association fired him in 1970.

Conclusion

The last Great Decisions group seen on *David Brinkley's Journal* met in Little Rock, Arkansas. It gathered in the nineteenth-century mansion of Didi Perry, a setting of 'magnolia, wisteria, and white columns', Brinkley said. As in Klamath Falls, Vietnam was at issue.

'We had better make up our minds that we are going to win', Perry said. 'We'd better be prepared anywhere that communism raises its head and finds anything desirable, we had better be prepared to get in the game.'

But communism, a Catholic priest replied, was a 'theoretical advance' in Vietnam, as the communists were 'guaranteeing these people equal rights'. They would be defeated only if the poverty on which they fed was overcome.

A retired Air Force officer bristled. 'I think in South Vietnam we ought to stay there', he said. 'In fact, I think we ought to extend it. We ought to carry the war to North Vietnam, and land our own guerilla forces up there, maybe throw a few bombs in a Hanoi café. A bomb-of-the-month club or something.' The others participants murmured. 'If we have to go so far as to take 'em over, I think we should go that far, too', he said. 'We can win, we should win in South Vietnam. We should stay there, and win.' As the picture faded out, it settled on a canvas hanging over the discussion, a portrait of Perry's father, a Confederate officer, feted still for his valor in a losing cause.

Great Decisions might look like a lost cause, too. Counterattacking the intellectual developments of its time, it embodied ideals that looked inclusive to its creators, but seem anything but now. With its politics of highbrow, consensual responsibility, it inscribed, endorsed, and made legitimate a narrow form of participation familiar to — but steadily more unpopular with — white, educated, usually wealthy elites, even as other Americans engaged with world affairs in other ways. Placing faith in publics, it offered no guarantees that they would succeed where experts failed, as the blustering Air Force officer demonstrated. But it is crucial to understand that even the Association at its most progressive saw participation as something that would take place strictly on elite terms; the foreign policy community saw its outreach work as educational, involving the top-down inculcation of facts and ideas, rather than as a process that would lead to adaptation and accommodation from the bottom up. That was not to say that foreign policy should not be responsive to public opinion in its broadest sense, but it was telling that Great Decisions required the State Department to do little more than answer the mail. Even if legislators paid more attention, with participants even testifying to Congress in 1974 and 1975, the promise of policy contributions was no reality.

Great Decisions, then, was a Deweyanism already on the retreat. Not for nothing did the Association seem indistinguishable from the Council on Foreign Relations to the members of Students for a Democratic Society who picketed the Association's fiftieth birthday dinner on November 14, 1967, at which secretary Rusk was the speaker. 'We're demonstrating against the Foreign Policy Association', one protestor yelled, after marching into Bryant Park; 'we're demonstrating against the American establishment, against the liberal fascists.'[113] The Association's vice-president, C. Dale Fuller, admitted the defeat of the Deweyan vision when promoting Great Decisions in Kentucky later that month, telling a reporter that he could understand the protests although he could not support them, given that 'individuals believe they have no other way to change America's stance.'[114]

Whatever its limits, Great Decisions shows that there was not a single 'establishment' hostile to serious public participation in foreign policy decisions; indeed, the Ford Foundation had not given up. The Association had become more controversial at Ford since 1956, but support had

continued. It requested $3.2 million in 1960 to focus on 'community leaders' rather than 'as many persons as possible'; the Foundation granted $1.5 million, although its staff warned that this was a 'baffling field'.[115] When the Association came back in 1964, Ford launched an inquiry. Robert Tucker, a political scientist schooled in postwar theory, reported that Great Decisions was inadequate and misguided, a 'device for the "pooling of ignorance"' — Deweyans hoped to pool limited intelligence — 'and for encouraging the relatively ignorant to assume that there is an easy shortcut to knowledgeability about foreign affairs'.[116] Ford concluded, partly based on statistical surveys that showed little change since in public knowledge of foreign affairs since the late 1940s, that that there was barely 'any likelihood of a dramatic breakthrough'.[117] Still, the Foundation initially redoubled its efforts, ploughing $1 million into the Association in 1965 before McGeorge Bundy, an architect of U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the 'establishment' man *par excellence*, became its president in 1966.[118] Ford officers still spoke of the necessity of the task, but Bundy, patron and teacher of the new social science as a Harvard dean even if he was the son of an Association branch chairman, had seen enough. Over Rusk's objections, he bid it farewell in December 1967.[119]

So thoroughly had elitist theory triumphed that the Association found it impossible not to give in. Behavioral social science was 'commandingly practiced and exemplified' at the University of Michigan, David Hollinger has written, and it was from there that the Association hired John Nason's successor in 1962.[120] Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., an economist and former State Department official who had written the blueprint for the Peace Corps, sought not to contest postwar theory as Mastrude and Nason once had, but to apply the lessons he had learned working alongside Survey Research Center scholars like Angus Campbell and Philip Converse, who had now come to even more skeptical findings than had Almond a decade before.[121] Hayes promptly held a conference at which Campbell and others said that reaching even the 'attentive public' was thought to be a 'tremendous task', and that there was 'considerable doubt' as to the 'feasibility or desirability of [the] general public reaching "decisions" on specific foreign policy issues'.[122] Hayes targeted the fifteen percent of citizens thought already to be active in politics, particularly the seven percent not yet interested in foreign policy; his board declared that while it would be desirable to educate the 'masses' on foreign policy, this posed 'insurmountable problems'.[123]

By studying Great Decisions, then, by studying the foreign policy community at its most open, we see the triumph of closure. Great Decisions failed, and that failure was one piece of evidence that played into a sense that the dream of a more democratic foreign policy had turned into a charade. But the triumph of what William Appleman Williams by 1972 identified as an 'extensive elitism' in U.S. foreign policy was not inevitable.[124] If we recover paths that finished in dead ends, we can come to a fuller understanding of the fate of democracy in U.S. foreign policy, and perhaps its future.

After all, this problem has not gone away. Today the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, like many analysts confronting the election of an 'America First' president, laments that 'it has proved ever more difficult to generate popular support for the country's actual foreign policy.'[125] One survey by the Center for American Progress has found that even informed, active voters 'simply did not understand' what experts mean with the language they have used since 2016, words like 'maintaining the liberal international order'.[126] The pages of *Foreign Affairs* discuss U.S. strategy overseas, but far less how that strategy might be rooted in democratic consent.

Testifying to our contemporary lack of innovation, Great Decisions still goes on, with corporate funding and at a smaller scale. Its latest iteration used PBS broadcasts to debate climate change, human trafficking, and the rise of China. There are still fact sheets; there is still a discussion group in every state; there is still participation in the six figures; there are still major figures in the foreign policy community involved. The final show, 'Americans and the World', still opens with opinion poll statistics purporting to show the ignorance of the public, and it still closes with pleas for the public to educate itself.[127] But it is not enough. More must be done if U.S. foreign policy is to have the basis in public opinion that policymakers agree it has lacked, work

that must meet people where they are, rather than where the foreign policy community wishes they might be. Recapturing the basic idea that foreign policy should be a democratic possession would be one place to start.

Notes

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2. *David Brinkley's Journal*, *NBC News*, 20 May 1963, Wisconsin Historical Society, Foreign Policy Association Records [FPA], Part 1, DC 774.
3. Jack L. Walker, 'A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy', *American Political Science Review*, lx (1966), 285–95; Ron Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Industrial Complex* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Daniel Bessner, *Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).
4. Most educators defined their ideal public much like Habermas, who was influenced by Dewey. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).
5. Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 40–55; Kyong-Min Son, *The Eclipse of the Demos: The Cold War and the Crisis of Democracy before Neoliberalism* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2020).
6. Richard C. Rowson, 'Whither FPA?' 25 Aug. 1955, FPA, Box 1/64. Box numbers for the FPA archives are given in the form Box [Part]/[Box].
7. Benjamin I. Page with Marshall M. Bouton, *The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want From Our Leaders But Don't Get* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Daniel Bessner and Stephen Wertheim, 'Democratizing U.S. Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, 5 April 2017, foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-05/democratizing-us-foreign-policy.
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10. Michael Wala, 'Selling the Marshall Plan at Home: The Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery', *Diplomatic History*, x (1986), 248; Stephen Wertheim, 'Reading the International Mind: International Public Opinion in Early Twentieth Century Anglo-American Thought', in Daniel Bessner and Nicolas Guilhot (ed), *The Decisionist Imagination: Sovereignty, Social Science, and Democracy in the 20th Century* (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2019), 49.
11. Research on the FPA is limited to Frank Winchester Abbott, 'From Versailles to Munich: The Foreign Policy Association and American foreign policy' (PhD dissertation, Texas Tech University, 1972); Alan Raucher, 'The First Foreign Affairs Think Tanks', *American Quarterly*, xxx (1978), 493–513.
12. See, e.g., Laurence Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy* (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1977); Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1984); Michael Wala, *The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1994); Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012).
13. Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 9.
14. Tracy B. Kittredge, 'International Relations Programs in the United States', 30 Sept. 1941, Rockefeller Archives Center, Rockefeller Foundation Records [RF], RG 3, Series 910, Box 7.
15. David E. Bell to McGeorge Bundy, 18 Dec. 1967, Ford Foundation Records, Rockefeller Archives Center [FF], FA732C, Grant 56-298, Reel 2257; 'Evaluation of Council on Foreign Relations Grants', 25 May 1977, FF, FA732B, Grant 54-27, Reel 1344. Generally on the Cold War Ford Foundation, see Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
16. See, e.g., Nancy E. Bernhard, *US Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947–1960* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006); Susan A. Brewer, *Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009).
17. Thomas W. Zeiler, 'The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field', *Journal of American History*, xcv (2009), 1053–73. The need to bring elites back into the study of U.S. foreign relations is a theme of Daniel

Bessner and Fredrik Logevall, 'Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations', *Texas National Security Review*, iii (2020), 38–55.

18. Melvin Small, 'Public Opinion', in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (ed), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 169–76.
19. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2000); Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003); Gretchen Heefner, *The Missile Next Door: The Minuteman in the American Heartland* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
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39. Ibid., 6, 240.
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